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Political cartoonists feel various forces for ‘censorship’ on and in
their work. Often these are informal pressures that are based on
moral or commercial interests, or the amorphous notion of  ‘good
taste’.1 This chapter seeks to focus on the formal legal pressures on
cartoonists. We suspect that cartoonists fear (and are led to fear by
cautious editorial staff) more legal sanction than is likely to be the
case, and that ‘legalling’ of  cartoons before publication is often a
cover for other sensitivities. But we first need to look at the state of
the law.
The legal ramifications of  cartooning occur after the fact when
someone complains, because political cartoons are highly unlikely to
be caught by the Office of  Film and Literature Classification’s pre-
publication vetting system. Films and computer games must be
classified prior to distribution, but the only ‘literature’ that needs to
be submitted for such vetting is that which:
having regard to the Code and the classification guidelines to
the extent that they relate to publications, contains depictions
or descriptions that: 
a. are likely to cause the publication to be [refused
classification]; or
b. are likely to cause offence to a reasonable adult to the
extent that the publication should not be sold or displayed
as an unrestricted publication; or
c. are unsuitable for a minor to see or read.2
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As the Code and the Guidelines relate primarily to sex, drugs,
crime, cruelty, violence, and revolting or abhorrent phenomena, it
would be very unusual for the publisher of  a political cartoon to be
required to submit it in advance. Although it is not inconceivable
that political satire could be considered ‘submittable’ if  it touches on
one of  these subjects3, this chapter focuses on two areas of  law that
are of  far greater practical significance to cartoonists.
Racial vilification laws passed in some states might be seen as
having some relevance, but they have specific exemptions for artistic
activity4, and do not appear to have any impact on cartoonists’
practice, so we will not discuss them further here. Similarly, there is
very little prospect that dormant blasphemy laws will be revived in
Australia, despite occasional calls from some quarters, either for
Christianity or for other faiths. We do not have space here to survey
obscenity laws, but point out that cartoons do not form a special
case separate from illustrations, photographs, or other publications
when it comes to obscenity.5
The main body of  law that impinges on cartoonists’ practice is
defamation, which will be the focus of  the first half  of  this chapter.
The second half  will discuss the possible implications for
cartoonists of  the revision of  the sedition laws undertaken in the
Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2) 2005 (Cth), passed just before the
Christmas recess in that year. 
Defamation
Strictly speaking, cartoonists and other satirists enjoy no more legal
protection under the laws of  libel and defamation than do any other
sorts of  writers, but it is clear that they get away with a lot more. The
text-book summary of  defamation describes it as the publication of
material which ‘tends to injure the personal, professional, trade or
business reputation of  an individual or a company, to expose them
to ridicule or to cause people to avoid them’.6 It is hard to imagine
that cartoonists cause many people to be avoided, but injuring
reputations and holding people up to ridicule are their core
activities. As the business of  satire is to attack the character and
impugn the motives of  public figures, you would have thought that
this would make satirists notable benefactors of  defamation lawyers.
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‘What a tragedy’, Peter Nicholson, Australian, 24 October 2001
Let us start with a consideration of  some cartoons that to a lay
reader might seem defamatory. The first cartoon by Peter
Nicholson, from the Tampa Election of  2001, attacks all the senior
politicians of  the moment for cruel opportunism:
For a fleeting moment, the readers will think that those on the
cliff  are mourning the loss of  life in the SIEV X disaster, but then
we read the caption and see that they are only mourning a lost
opportunity for politicking. This is a very stern, albeit bi-partisan,
attack on the reputations of  Howard, Ruddock, Reith, Abbott,
Anderson, Crean and Beazley, and is arguably unfair to the point of
malice.
Ron Tandberg’s accusation of  bribery in the promises that
abounded during the 2004 campaign is a similarly blunt attack on
John Howard’s reputation for honesty (see ‘Anyone still undecided?’,
overleaf).
There are at least two reasons why John Howard and the other
politicians attacked here would not dare sue the cartoonists,
especially during an election campaign. Handsley and Davis are not
surprised that there are so few defamation cases on satire for, as they
explain:
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Most people when they are lampooned prefer not to give the satirist
a further platform and further publicity by bringing proceedings …
In addition, most observers would instantly recognise satirical
commentary as inherently in the nature of  comment, and therefore
easy to defend under defamation law.7
This quotation identifies both the cultural defence satirists enjoy
from lawsuits—few like simultaneously to make fools of  themselves
and give their detractors publicity—and the legal protection of  fair
comment. This common law defence is discussed in more detail
below, but in 1980 it defeated the only case we know of  in which a
politician sued for a cartoon: a Canadian court decided that it was
fair comment to depict a politician picking the wings off  flies.8 This
case is very much the exception that proves the rule that politicians
in the English-speaking world tend to stay out of  court when
seeking to muzzle the effect of  satire on their reputations.
It is notable that the one libel suit concerning a cartoon in
Australian law was made not by a politician, but by an architect, the
late Harry Seidler. In the National Times of  15 August 1982, Patrick
Cook had drawn ten ugly boxes, some human figures and a night
cart over the caption ‘Harry Seidler Retirement Park’.
His defamation suit was unsuccessful both before a jury and on
appeal.9 The conclusion we draw from this episode is that Seidler as
an architect was less hardened to the rough and tumble of  public
debate than serving politicians tend to be, and in this sense he may
have further damaged his own reputation by being over-sensitive to
criticism.
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‘Anyone still undecided?’, Ron Tandberg, Age, 28 September 2004
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We can find no cases of  active politicians suing cartoonists for
defamation in Australia. There are a handful of  stories like Alan
Moir’s, recounted in his chapter of  this book, where politicians have
sent letters threatening legal action, but even these are very rare;
none has been taken to court. That there is so little case law on
defamatory cartoons leads us to the conclusion that cartoonists
enjoy something very close to a de facto immunity from suit.
Moreover, if  cases were brought, a strong defence of  fair comment
would be led by the cartoonists’ lawyers, with a high chance of
success, even for very bluntly abusive works.
This cartoonists’ immunity may be as much a culturally accepted
licence as a strictly legal protection—for example, no one seems
inclined to run a defamation case focused on the element of  the law
where cartoons seem most vulnerable, exposing people to ridicule.
Most aggrieved people obviously recognise that suing a cartoonist
will not do anything to restore lost reputation (the aim which
theoretically underlies the law of  defamation), and will very
probably damage their reputation further, both by refocusing
attention on the original allegation and by proclaiming them to the
world as people who cannot take a joke.
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‘Harry Seidler Retirement Park’, 
Patrick Cook, National Times, 15 August 1982
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Fair comment and honest opinion
As already mentioned, the key defence for cartoonists under
defamation law has been the common law defence of  fair comment.
Examples of  other defences are justification (truth), absolute
privilege (for example, parliamentary speeches) and qualified
privilege (for example, communication about governmental or
political matters, under the Lange doctrine). New uniform
defamation legislation is in place or proposed in all states and
territories, and it supplements fair comment with a defence referred
to as ‘honest opinion’. We will first discuss the common law defence,
and then describe how the statutory defence closes off  some gaps it
left open, putting cartoonists in an even more firmly protected
position.10
The fact that fair comment is a defence means that if  the
defendant can prove all its elements, he or she is not liable. In
practice it means that a person referred to in a defamatory
communication by a person who can prove all the elements of  fair
comment will not generally sue in the first place. The exception
might be where the person referred to believes that he or she can
prove the publication was motivated by malice, or a desire to do
harm to the plaintiff. The defendant does not need to prove absence
of  malice, but rather the plaintiff  must prove not only its presence,
but that it was the prime motivation for the defendant’s actions. This
will invariably be impossible to prove in the case of  a political
cartoon.
At common law, the availability of  fair comment depends on a
cartoonist’s ability to prove the following:
• that the statement being made is in the nature of
comment, that is, opinion rather than fact;
• that the opinion expressed is genuinely held (but see
below);
• that the subject-matter of  the statement is a matter of
public interest; 
• that the statement is based on true facts; and
• that the true facts are stated or indicated in the
communication (see below).
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The Cook/Seidler cartoon above illustrates how the defence
works in practice: (1) the cartoon is a statement on the aesthetic
qualities of  Seidler’s architecture, which is inherently a matter of
opinion; (2) we can assume the opinion was genuinely held, at least
by Patrick Cook; (3) the work of  a hugely successful and influential
architect is clearly a matter of  public interest. That much is clear, in
spite of  the argument advanced by Mr Seidler’s counsel, that
because all the buildings he had designed were privately owned, they
were not matters of  public interest! We shall return to the
relationship with the truth.
The importance of  fair comment as a defence for cartoonists
and their publishers lies in the fact that it focuses on comment as
distinct from fact. It is possible that all cartoons might be
considered by the courts not as assertions of  fact about their targets
but ‘as comment and nothing else’.11 However, there were a couple
of  things in the common law defence of  fair comment about which
we were not quite certain: first, legally, we have never been sure in
Australia whether the opinion has to be genuinely held by the
defendant, even if  that person is only the publisher (for example,
the newspaper editor), or whether it is enough that it could
genuinely be held by the person who originally expressed it (for
example, the cartoonist). As this has never been tested in Australia,
all we had was conflicting overseas authority.12
The uniform defamation legislation has now cleared all this up.
(It might be worth noting, as an aside, that the New South Wales Act
under which the Seidler case was fought had also sorted it out13, but
that did not stop Seidler’s counsel from attempting to claim
aggravated damages based on an argument that Fairfax did not share
Cook’s view of  Mr Seidler’s architecture. Hunt J described that claim
as ‘heretical in the extreme’.14) But it clearly leaves a slight loophole
open for politicians and others, especially if  it is true that cartoonists
have real freedom to depart from the editorial line. One would
expect that many newspapers, then, would not be able to prove they
‘genuinely’ held the opinions being expressed by their cartoonists.
This must have represented a niggling concern at the backs of  the
minds of  newspapers and their lawyers. But it did not affect
cartoonists themselves, except to the extent it might make their
employers a little more cautious about what they printed.
The second reservation one might have about the applicability of
fair comment to cartoons is that they do not usually state or indicate
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the background facts. Usually they assume the reader knows what
facts are being referred to. So, for example, the Warren Brown
cartoon from 26 October 2001 (see below) relies on us knowing that
there is an election due on 10 November. Readers simply cannot get
the message unless they know the factual substratum. In fact, in this
case, as in the vast majority of  cases, readers scarcely get any
message at all unless they know it.
To return to Patrick Cook’s cartoon about Harry Seidler: to ‘get’
its message, readers needed to have an awareness about public
debates on architecture. They would need a fairly detailed
knowledge of  who had designed what around Sydney, as few readers
of  the National Times, we suspect, would (especially those who lived
elsewhere). This might explain why the Cook cartoon got the
publishers into so much more trouble than the many hundreds of
thousands of  cartoons published since. Perhaps there is an
argument that the cartoon was just gratuitous and nasty—as most
cartoons are not. Unfortunately for Mr Seidler, however, the jury in
his case against Fairfax thought that the cartoon was based on
‘proper material’ (being the phrase used in the NSW Defamation Act
then in force). The material in question was a number of  buildings
Mr Seidler had designed, including his own house.
The Seidler case turned mostly on the application of  the ‘proper
material’ requirement under the NSW Act. In a sense it is surprising
that the limits of  the ‘stated facts’ requirement were never tested in
those parts of  Australia that relied only on the common law until
2005. Perhaps those limits are usually addressed by the fact that the
cartoon appears on an op-ed page where the facts are laid out, at
least to some extent.
Both of  these issues have been ironed out by the introduction of
the defence of  honest opinion in the new uniform defamation
legislation. The South Australian Defamation Act 2005, for example,
provides separate defences for those who are sued:
• For their own statements of  opinion15;
• For a statement of  opinion by an employee or agent16; and
• For a statement of  opinion by another person.17
Only in the first case is it necessary to show that the defendant
honestly held the opinion. In the case of  an employee or agent, it is
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necessary to show that ‘the defendant believed that the opinion was
honestly held by the employee or agent at the time the matter was
published’. In the case of  another person (for example, the writer of
a letter to the editor) the defendant need only show it had no reason
to believe the opinion was not honestly held.
Clearly the second category defence closes off  the small
loophole noted earlier in relation to newspapers and cartoonists. It
might lead to the faintly absurd spectacle of  editors calling the
cartoonist in each day to say: ‘Now, you really do hold this opinion,
don’t you?’ However, the absence of  any requirement of  ‘reasonable
grounds’ for the belief  would mean that in the vast majority of
situations, editors can rely on their general knowledge of  the
cartoonist’s character and political stance (not to mention the
inherent unlikelihood that a cartoonist would ever want to express
an opinion he or she did not honestly hold!).
As to the second reservation, that of  the need to state the facts
relied on, the new defence requires that the statement be ‘based on
proper material’, which is defined in much the same way as under
the common law, that is, true or privileged.18 There is no
requirement that that material be stated or included in the statement.
Therefore the defendant need only be able to prove its ‘propriety’ in
the event that a suit is brought. People who are depicted in cartoons
would usually have a pretty good idea which facts can be proved—
and once again, in cartoons, the underlying facts are generally
notorious. What all this means is that the existence of  an honest
opinion defence provides cartoonists with a great deal of  protection
and, frankly, freedom to defame others.
Satire and literalism: the fault lines
The only risk for cartoonists under defamation law is that their
material will be interpreted in a literal way, ignoring the irony and
exaggeration that are the stock in trade of  satirists. Such an
interpretation can derail the application of  the fair comment
defence by requiring the cartoonist to defend a meaning which he or
she did not intend. However, a comparison of  two cases, one
involving a satirical song and one involving a cartoon, shows that
even this risk is very slight in the case of  cartoons.
In 1997, Pauline Hanson sought and received an interlocutory
injunction to stop the ABC’s youth radio network, JJJ, from playing
Elizabeth Handsley & Robert Phiddian 71
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
the satirical song ‘(I’m a) Back Door Man’ by Simon Hunt, AKA
Pauline Pantsdown. The song consisted of  words and phrases
sampled from Hanson’s speeches and interviews, rearranged to
make outrageous statements such as ‘I’m very proud that I’m not
straight’ and ‘I’m a very caring potato’. In their analysis of  the
litigation, Handsley and Davis showed how ill-equipped a black-
letter, literal-minded approach to law was to cope with satirical
communication, for the Queensland Court of  Appeal treated the
words as if  they were literal assertions about the politician Pauline
Hanson, likely to be taken literally by a reasonable listener. It is hard
to understand how their Honours so misconstrued the context of
the song. The ABC did not even get to the point of  arguing fair
comment (or its equivalent under the Queensland Defamation
Code) for the precise reason that the literalist approach overlooked
the comment, or opinion, element of  the song and took it as strictly
factual.
However, such subtleties are less likely to be a problem for
cartoons, where the context of  caricature is explicit. This prediction
is borne out by the result in the Seidler case. Unlike de Jersey CJ and
the other members of  the Queensland Court of  Appeal who found
in favour of  Hanson against the ABC, the judges in Seidler appeared
capable of  understanding satire.
Cook’s cartoon did not relate to any contemporary debate in the
paper or elsewhere about the value of  Seidler’s work; he certainly
was not engaged to design a retirement home. According to David
Marr’s account of  the trial in the National Times, ‘Seidler saw the
cartoon as an unwarranted attack on his life’s work … [He] took it
that Cook was being quite literal, that he had actually built a house
with no roof, no door, able to fit only one inhabitant who had to be
fed sandwiches through a slot’.19 This attitude was translated into
the following argument by Seidler’s counsel:
Since there was no evidence that the plaintiff  had ever designed a
structure answering the description of  a retirement park the factual
basis for comment identified by the cartoonist contained a
misstatement. As a result the comment was not based upon proper
material and the defence of  comment was not available.20
This passage demonstrates that Seidler, through his counsel, fell
into precisely the same error as the Queensland Court of  Appeal did
in the Hanson case: reading satire literally. Glass JA had this to say:
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An ordinary reader would understand that cartoons are often not to
be taken literally and would gain a suggestion of  a fictitious project from
the term ‘retirement park’ or so the jury could reasonably find.
According to an illustration mentioned during argument the
ordinary reader contemplating a well known Saturday cartoon
would not necessarily understand it to allege as a fact that the Prime
Minister and Treasurer discuss the economy sitting in the branches
of  a tree. The jury must have found that the cartoon made its
comment on the plaintiff ’s architecture by representing in allegorical
from [sic] the kind of  retirement village which would be designed by an
architect who lacked aesthetic sensibilities.21
We applaud the New South Wales Court of  Appeal for its more
sophisticated reading of  the material. On the other hand, we might
take the difference in the two courts’ approaches to the satire as an
indication that, once again, the visual nature of  cartoons might
lessen the risk of  category error: it is that much more difficult to
miss the satirical nature of  a cartoon.
A chilling effect?
We have shown that it is very rare for cartoons to be the subject of
defamation actions, and that even when they are, they have a stout
defence in their favour. And yet, the law does cast a shadow over the
practice of  cartoonists and their editors. The fear of  litigation is
much more pervasive than the reality of  effective immunity from
suit. As Dean Alston, cartoonist with the West Australian, observes:
If  I’m dancing on the borderline of  slander, cartoons which could
be a worry are vetted by the company lawyer. If  it’s deemed too
dangerous legally, we’ll pull the cartoon. Most of  it is self-imposed
censorship. You know what is going to be acceptable, and what is
going to be over the top and absolutely affronting to people.
If  a cartoon is thought by the editor to be unsuitable, he will say,
‘Look I think that is going a bit too far’. And that’s fine with me.
But if  it comes to the point where I think the cartoon really should
be run, I stand up and say I want it run. And they’re pretty good
and fair about it.22
It is quite impossible to quantify the effect of  legal caution on
cartooning comment, but there is enough anecdotal evidence to
suggest that it is real. Many cartoonists talk of  having work checked
and sometimes rejected by the company lawyers. It would be a
fascinating research project to study some rejected cartoons, but
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these are, of  their nature, difficult to track down. Until someone is
foolish enough to run a test case through the courts, our opinion
that cartoonists and their editors should not be anxious on this
point can be no more than an educated guess. It is a guess that is
further informed by the existence of  an implied freedom of  political
communication under the Constitution. Even if  fair comment
failed, the ‘Lange’ defence of  qualified privilege for discussion of
political and government affairs23, or some version of  it, might
protect a cartoonist who might not have had his or her facts quite
right.
Interestingly, ‘legalling’ of  cartoons can cut both ways, as a
positive opinion can protect them from having a cartoon the editor
fears or dislikes ‘pulled’. Alan Moir, of  the Sydney Morning Herald,
explains that his contract follows the 1927 precedent of  the
renowned David Low, whereby publication of  cartoons is
guaranteed as long as they are legal: ‘Sometimes the cartoon which
appears beside the editorial is in contradiction to the editorial;
sometimes by coincidence, it is the same. But there is never any
problem. They have never attempted to stop or even remark on a
cartoon in 14 years’.24 This seems to be the position experienced by
many cartoonists, and yet the fear (as distinct from the reality) of
legal reprisal still shadows cartoonists.
Sedition
In November 2005, the Federal Government used its new majority
in both houses of  parliament to rush through a revision of  the
sedition laws (first instituted in Australia in 1914 and last used in
1949) in the context of  a wide-ranging anti-terrorism law. It became
a sort of  shorthand in the media for the possible implications of
this new law that political cartoonists might be jailed for seditious
work, cartoonists acting as a synecdoche for free speech. This
transcript from the ABC’s flagship current affairs program, The 7.30
Report, gives a sense of  the reaction:
KERRY O’BRIEN: And now to sedition laws … critics say sedition is
an archaic concept and that the criminal code already provides
protection against such behaviour. Among those voices of  dissent,
some of  Australia’s best known cartoonists and satirists who claim
they too could now face the threat of  jail. Geoff  Hutchison reports.
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LAURENCE MAHER, BARRISTER: Sedition is an old criminal offence
going back 500 years, which was designed to prevent speech and
conduct which was thought to be a precursor to treason. So that,
for example, if  one were foolish enough to suggest that the king
was a fool then you faced conviction and on conviction the penalty
of  death would be applied.
BILL LEAK, CARTOONIST, THE AUSTRALIAN: Sedition is a, sort of,
basic component of  satire. If  your cartoon or your satire can’t be
considered as seditious then you’re probably not doing a very good
job.25
There is a sense in which the dictionary definition of  sedition
supports Leak’s point. For example, the Australian Concise Oxford
Dictionary offers, as definition 2, ‘agitation against the authority of
the state’26, which is pretty close to Leak’s perceived job description.
The following cartoon of  his from the 2004 election campaign
provides an example of  this kind of  communication, stating bluntly
that John Howard is waging a war of  terror against the voters in the
interests of  political advantage.
The interesting thing is that this cartoon generated considerable
criticism, not for its potentially seditious depiction of  the Prime
‘The war of  terror’, 
Bill Leak, Australian, 25 September 2004
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Minister, but for the dubious taste of  involving the image of  Ken
Bigley, the British hostage murdered in Iraq, in a domestic political
cartoon.
The following two cartoons by Warren Brown from the election
campaign of  2001, when the issue was the troop deployment to
Afghanistan in the wake of  the September 11 attack, provide an
interesting contrast between a patriotic response to going to war and
sedition by the Leak definition.
A week after the first cartoon, Brown had moved from warmly
patriotic support of  the diggers to the sarcastic implication that the
soldiers were being sent to Afghanistan to win the government
votes at the election scheduled for November 10.
In earlier times of  war (especially the First and Second World
Wars), such an image would have been censored, but in 2001 all it
generated was some hostile comment in the letters pages.
Would these hostile cartoons have been in trouble under the
revived sedition laws of  2005? The more we study the controversy,
the less we think that it had any substantive legal (as opposed to
political) content. But first we should work through the events and
the law in more detail.
The Opposition picked up on the issue of  cartoonists, with
leader Kim Beazley seeking simultaneously to be a fearless protector
of  free speech and staunch pursuer of  the war on terror:
‘I’m all for jailing terrorists but I don’t think we ought to jail
cartoonists. The sedition laws are about protecting politicians. The
detention laws are about protecting Australians,’ Mr Beazley said.
‘I’m all for protecting Australians, I’m not for protecting politicians,
and we’re talking about politicians’ reputations, not their lives. I do
not know why the Government insists that we should lower
ourselves to the standard of  North Korea, Syria and Cuba.’27
The Coalition government was quick to dispute that there was
any significant threat to cartoonists or free speech, and this does
have some credence considering the sedition offences outlined in
the Act conform more to the other, more precise sense of  definition
1, ‘conduct or speech inciting to rebellion or a breach of  public
order’.28 Both the Attorney-General, Phillip Ruddock, and John
Howard hit the airwaves vigorously insisting that there was nothing
to worry about:
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‘Come home safe, Digger’, Warren Brown, Daily Telegraph, 18 October 2001
‘November 10’, Warren Brown, Daily Telegraph, 26 October 2001
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‘Journalists, cartoonists, actors and all other sundry critics of  the
Government have nothing to fear from these new proposals,’ the
Prime Minister said. ‘People can still attack me and Mr Beazley and
lampoon us, as I am sure they will, without any fear of  being put in
the slammer.’29
Awareness of  the debate extended beyond Australia, as this
report from a part of  the world that has been on the receiving end
of  Australian advice about freedom of  speech and independence of
public institutions, suggests:
Howard insisted the new laws were not intended to hamper
freedom of  speech. ‘These laws will not stop journalists attacking
the government, they will not stop cartoonists lampooning the
prime minister [sic] and the leader of  the opposition,’ Howard told
public radio. ‘They will not prevent free and open debate because in
substance they are no different from the sedition laws that have
existed in the past.’30
Nationally, there was widespread disquiet about the laws’
implications, and about the apparent urgency with which they were
being pursued. There was a hurried Senate ‘Inquiry into the
provisions of  the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2) 2005’, which received
294 submissions in its brief  life.31 Even the Coalition members of
the Senate Committee were unimpressed by the implications of  the
Bill for free speech, and recommended delay. Instead, the Attorney-
General made some hurried amendments to address the more
glaring concerns and insisted that the Bill be passed before
Christmas, which it duly was. The law was, however, referred to the
Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) for inquiry and report
on:
a. whether the amendments … effectively address the
problem of  urging the use of  force or violence;
b. whether ‘sedition’ is the appropriate term to identify this
conduct;
c. whether [the amended law] is effective to address the
problem of  organisations that advocate or encourage the
use of  force of  violence to achieve political objectives; and
d. any related matter.
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The terms of  reference were dated 1 March 2006, with the
report due no later than 30 May. Once again, then, we see evidence
of  indecent haste about this matter on the government’s part—
though in this case the ALRC was able to slow the train down
somewhat. It produced a substantial Issues Paper by the end of
March and a Discussion Paper followed on 29 May, with
submissions due by 3 July. The final report was published on 13
September.
Considering the controversy that has surrounded the
introduction of  the amendments, it is worth stepping back to assess
the likely implications of  the new legislation, specifically for the
cartoonists who were often at the centre of  the debate. What we
have to say will have some bearing on other satirical practice in the
arts, literature and media, but may play out rather differently in
detail.
Application of  the 2005 law to cartoons
The Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2.) 2005 (Cth) repeals the old sedition
provisions in the Crimes Act 1914 and substitutes certain provisions
of  the Criminal Code. In this section we will look at the content of
those new provisions and consider their application to Kudelka’s
‘Guidelines for cartoonists’.
‘Guidelines for cartoonists’, Jon Kudelka, Australian, 17 November 2005
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It is hard to imagine a more scathing cartoon than this, and it is
also reasonable to suppose it would easily meet Leak’s definition of
‘seditious’. But is it in breach of  this provision that the Anti-
Terrorism Act 2005 (Cth) inserted into the Criminal Code?
80.2 Urging the overthrow of  the Constitution or Government 
1. A person commits an offence if  the person urges another
person to overthrow by force or violence:
a. the Constitution; or
b. the Government of  the Commonwealth, a State or a
Territory; or
c. the lawful authority of  the Government of  the
Commonwealth.
Clearly not. The cartoon may be quite vicious and personal against
John Howard, and it might even be seen as undermining his
authority, but it does not urge violence and it is therefore clearly not
seditious. It is not seditious to cast aspersions on the head of
government’s appearance, his height, or even the size of  his genitals.
Nor is it seditious to accuse him of  vanity or childish cricket dreams.
Therefore Kudelka would have been at no risk of  the maximum
penalty of  seven years imprisonment under section 80.2(1).
There are similar provisions relating to ‘Urging interference in
Parliamentary elections’32, ‘Urging violence within the
community’33, ‘Urging a person to assist the enemy’34 and ‘Urging a
person to assist those engaged in armed hostilities’.35 Kudelka’s
cartoon would be some way off  breaching any of  these provisions
either.
Furthermore, all offences in section 80.236 have the following
defence:
80.3 Defence for acts done in good faith
1. Sections 80.1 and 80.2 do not apply to a person who:
a. tries in good faith to show that any of  the following
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ii. the Governor-General;
iii. the Governor of  a State;
iv. the Administrator of  a Territory;
v. an adviser of  any of  the above;
vi. a person responsible for the government of  another
country; or
b. points out in good faith errors or defects in the
following, with a view to reforming those errors or
defects:
i. the Government of  the Commonwealth, a State or
a Territory;
ii. the Constitution;
iii. legislation of  the Commonwealth, a State, a
Territory or another country;
iv. the administration of  justice of  or in the
Commonwealth, a State, a Territory or another
country; or
c. urges in good faith another person to attempt to
lawfully procure a change to any matter established by
law, policy or practice in the Commonwealth, a State, a
Territory or another country; or
d. points out in good faith any matters that are producing,
or have a tendency to produce, feelings of  ill-will or
hostility between different groups, in order to bring
about the removal of  those matters; or
e. does anything in good faith in connection with an
industrial dispute or an industrial matter; or
f. publishes in good faith a report or commentary about
a matter of  public interest.
Kudelka’s cartoon would undoubtedly have benefited from
paragraph (f) and also possibly paragraph (b), depending on how
sophisticated a reading were accorded to the image.
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Warren Brown’s ‘November 10’ cartoon might be seen as cutting
closer to the bone, typifying the sort of  cartoon spawned by
Australia’s involvement in the Iraq war. It questions the wisdom of
our involvement in the war, and impugns the government’s motives
for allowing us to become involved. But once again it does so
without urging the violent overthrow of  the government, or urging
anybody to assist the enemy. Even if  it did urge assistance of  the
enemy, surely it would benefit from the application of  the defence
of  good faith, at the very least paragraph (f) in that the cartoonist
has only ‘publishe[d] in good faith a report or commentary about a
matter of  public interest’.37 The ‘matter’ in question would be the
political decision-making of  the Commonwealth government. What
could be of  greater public interest?
There is also the possibility that the cartoon itself  could be seen
as assisting the enemy, not just urging others to do so. Such a view
would be based on the idea that lowering the morale of  Australian
troops is a benefit to the enemy. In that event it would be treason,
not sedition.38 One requirement that the prosecution would have to
meet in such a case would be to show that the cartoonist had intent
to assist the enemy, which would usually be hard to do.
While these laws might be of  real concern to political activists, it
is very unlikely that the kind of  political cartoons to which we are
accustomed in Australia, at least in the mainstream media, would fall
foul of  these laws, and even more unlikely that they would not be
able to benefit from the defence.
Therefore it is clear that the new laws are based on the alternative
and narrower definition of  ‘sedition’, not on Leak’s broader and
more colloquial one. However, precisely because of  the colloquial
nature of  Leak’s definition, it would make sense to remove the word
from these laws and to use instead a formulation that captures the
nature of  the laws. This is precisely what the ALRC recommended
in its September 2006 report: the replacement of  ‘sedition’ with the
phrase ‘Urging political or inter-group force or violence’.39 In the
ALRC’s words:
It would be unfortunate … if  continued use of  the term ‘sedition’
were to cast a shadow over the new pattern of  offences. The term
‘sedition’ is too closely associated in the public mind with its origins
and history as a crime rooted in criticising—or ‘exciting
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disaffection’ against—the established authority. Consequently …
the ALRC recommends that the term ‘sedition’ no longer be used
in federal criminal law.
It might also be worth noting that the ALRC has proposed that
the definition of  treason be re-framed to make it clear that only
material assistance to the enemy is an offence.40 Such a change would
have the precise purpose of  indicating ‘that mere rhetoric or
expressions of  dissent do not amount to “assistance” for these
purposes’.41 The result would be that Brown’s cartoon would not
even be arguably treason.
There are two other things that support the conclusion that these
cartoons would not have been held seditious if  published after the
new laws were passed: first, the provisions that these laws are
replacing used the word ‘excite’ where these use ‘urge’.42 While
neither term is defined, ‘excite’ can be read as requiring more of  an
objective assessment of  the likely effect of  the communication—so
you might be prosecuted for ‘exciting’ others to overthrow the
government even though it was not your subjective intent that
others do so. It is possible to imagine a cartoon that is simply so
inflammatory that it could be seen as carrying a likelihood that
people would get so angry they would be driven to overthrow the
government by violent means. ‘Urge’ carries a more deliberate
connotation: you cannot ‘urge’ someone to overthrow the
government without there being some kind of  specific reference to
overthrowing the government in the communication—or at least to
an act that would have the effect of  overthrowing the government.
Ironically, the first major cartoon-related controversy that blew
up after introduction of  the new laws related to some apparently
blasphemous images of  the prophet Mohammed, originally
published by a conservative Danish newspaper. These might be seen
as just the kind of  inflammatory cartoons hypothesised in the
previous paragraph. The application to them of  the new provisions
provides a good illustration of  what a narrow concept ‘urge’ is.
The provision that comes closest to addressing this situation is
sub-section (5) of  section 80.2:
Urging violence within the community
A person commits an offence if: 
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a. the person urges a group or groups (whether distinguished
by race, religion, nationality or political opinion) to use
force or violence against another group or other groups
(as so distinguished); and
b. the use of  the force or violence would threaten the peace,
order and good government of  the Commonwealth.43
If  the provision still used the word ‘excite’, you might see
retaliatory violence as having been ‘excited’ by the publication of
inflammatory cartoons. But do the cartoons ‘urge’ violence by
Muslims? For one thing, the cartoons are not even aimed at
Muslims, so how can they be seen as ‘urging’ any particular
behaviour on the part of  Muslims? Moreover, to say the cartoon
‘urges’ violence suggests the cartoonist sees such violence as good
and right and justified. Those who want to bait Muslims certainly do
not see it that way. The publication of  the cartoons clearly does not
‘urge’ violence, even if  the publisher should realise that is a likely
result.
It is interesting to note that the old Crimes Act provision referred
to an intention to promote ‘feelings of  ill will or hostility between
classes of  her Majesty’s subjects’ as a seditious intention.44 So under
the old laws, publication of  the cartoons might have been unlawful.
This would suggest that the new laws have, if  anything, opened up
the field for freer expression than was allowed under the previous
laws.
This view is further supported by the second consideration,
which looks at the ‘recklessness’ provisions. Section 80.2(1), for
example, is followed immediately by this provision:
2. Recklessness applies to the element of  the offence under
subsection (1) that it is:
a. the Constitution; or
b. the Government of  the Commonwealth, a State or a
Territory; or
c. the lawful authority of  the Government of  the
Commonwealth 
that the first-mentioned person urges the other person to
overthrow.45
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In other words, if  you urge behaviour which would have the
effect of  overthrowing the Constitution (etc.) but you don’t realise
that because you don’t know what the Constitution (etc.) is, and you
don’t particularly care that it would have that effect, you can still be
held liable for the offence. The proscriptions on urging interference
in elections and urging violence within the community both have a
similar ‘recklessness’ provision.
These provisions do not make any reference to the defendant’s
perception as to whether people, on receiving his or her
communication, are likely to take steps to overthrow the
government. The provisions could have said that the offence
extends to situations where someone is reckless as to what people do
in response to what he or she does or says. But they do not. This
appears to mean the offence is committed only by people who
intentionally try to get others to commit violent acts that would have
the effect of  overthrowing the government. It is very unlikely that
this will ever be true of  a cartoonist in Australia.
The foregoing logic might be seen as a little too subtle and
legalistic for us to feel confident that cartoonists (and others) will
know precisely what they are allowed to do. Therefore there would
be no harm in removing any doubt by including a provision that to
be convicted of  an offence under section 80.2 ‘the person must
intend that the urged force or violence will occur’ in accordance
with the ALRC’s recommendation.46
Once again, this is not to say that the Anti-Terrorism Act is not
open to question in a liberal democracy that values political
freedom. We might arrive at a point where a violent overthrow of
the government would be the only means of  protecting
fundamental justice and liberties. If  we did, this law would prevent
people from encouraging others to take the necessary action.
However, we are not there yet, and, in any event, probably every
country on earth has some kind of  law under which the state can
prosecute those who might see themselves as freedom fighters.
Indeed, the ALRC has put the view that ‘governments have a perfect
right, and in many cases a duty, to legislate to protect the institutions
of  democracy … from attack by force or violence’.47 From this
perspective we might tell our hypothetical freedom fighters that if
democracy has broken down to a point where violence is the only
solution, the prospect of  a sedition trial in the event they lose the
struggle is probably the least of  their worries.
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On any view, the point remains that the sedition laws are very
unlikely to touch political cartoons as we know them. The alarm
among cartoonists that the new laws were part of  a plan to muzzle
their sort of  licensed dissent seems to be groundless, and the
underlying politics of  spending so much political capital on
something bound to create anxiety and change little remain opaque
to us. The likeliest explanation we can come up with is also the
‘dumbest’. In the wake of  the London bombings, the government
may just have been determined to give the various security
organisations everything they asked for. As Natalie O’Brien and
Patrick Walters reported: 
From that moment [i.e. the London bombing of  12 July 2005],
Australian Federal Police Commissioner Mick Keelty was ‘knocking
on an open door’ with his requests for greater police powers to
fight terrorism, according to senior government sources.48
After all, who would want to be the prime minister or attorney
general who had refused the reforms that would have prevented a
terrorist attack within Australia? The sedition laws came as part of  a
package of  anti-terror legislation, and the other parts make
significant changes. The most economical explanation is that a
government determined to present as ‘tough on terror’ felt that,
politically, it could not afford to back down on any part of  the
package, even a controversial one with little or no legal impact. More
sinister theories about an overly authoritarian government engaging
in hidden attacks on freedom of  speech49 are worth considering but
need further investigation and evidence to be convincing. In any
event, such theories, if  ultimately found to be justified, have a
significance reaching far beyond the terms of  any particular piece of
legislation. Indeed, one might see the legislation as a symptom,
rather than as a problem in its own right.
With a couple of  exceptions, then, it appears that the
government was correct in its assertions that the Anti-Terrorism Act
hardly changes anything in sedition law. One small but possibly
significant change is actually in defendants’ favour; that is, the
introduction of  para (f) in the good faith defence. There are also
some quaint instances of  such things as changing ‘one of  her
Majesty’s subjects’ to ‘a person’. The main change is to bring the
laws in from the Crimes Act to the Criminal Code. This is not legally
Comic Commentators86
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
significant, but rather part of  a project that has been going on for
years, to ‘migrate’ all substantive offences from the Act to the Code,
leaving the Act to deal only with procedural matters.
The greatest danger of  these laws is that their passage might lead
people, including cartoonists, to be more self-censoring in their
public statements because of  a perception of  risk of  legal reprisal.
If  that is so, we hope that this article can play a part in restoring their
confidence.
There are two more general arguments against the 2005 laws,
which we discuss briefly here even though they do not have any
special application to political cartoons.
It has been suggested that the passage of  a new law breathes new
life into the offence of  sedition, and is bound to make the
authorities more likely to use it.50 The ALRC appears to be agnostic
on this point, but did hint that it saw such concerns as ‘justifiable’.51
We do not necessarily agree. The reason sedition laws have hardly
been applied for so long is because there has been hardly anyone
breaching them. They are, after all, very specific laws addressing a
very limited range of  conduct. We see no immediate danger of  the
laws suddenly being flashed around the place, unless there is some
kind of  surge in (for example) communications urging violent
overthrow of  the government. In this connection it is worth noting
that the ALRC’s proposed remedy to reinvigoration is not a return to
the old laws!
It has also been argued that any sedition law at all is unnecessary,
as the same effect can be achieved with the general incitement
provisions of  the criminal law.52 Everything that section 80.2 says
one cannot ‘urge’ someone else to do is a crime—so, in principle, it
should already be a crime to incite someone else to do it. However,
the ‘incitement’ provision of  the Criminal Code requires that the
accused intend that the specific offence ‘incited’ be committed.53
The offences under section 80 do not require anything so specific;
in the words of  the ALRC, they do not necessarily ‘cover conduct
that amounts to a more generalised call to action’.54 So the question
becomes whether there is any justification for singling out particular
types of  physical offences (terrorism, treason and so on) for harsher
treatment of  those who advocate them. The ALRC suggested that
there is a justification, because these laws aim to address a special
Elizabeth Handsley & Robert Phiddian 87
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
kind of  harm: ‘the creation of  an environment in which the
likelihood of  force or violence being used for the proscribed
purposes is increased’.55
The difference between incitement and sedition is reflected in
the penalty structures for the two types of  offence. For at least some
of  those offences of  which sedition is an incitement, the penalty is
life imprisonment.56 Therefore the penalty for incitement would be
imprisonment for ten years.57 Yet, under the sedition provisions, the
penalty is only seven years. This is only fitting, considering the
broader and more general nature of  the communications caught by
sedition.
Is it possible that an abusive government could apply these laws
to imprison cartoonists? Of  course it is. It is in the nature of  an
abusive government to do as it pleases and misapply any laws on the
books to imprison whom it pleases (or whoever displeases it). By the
time we got to the point of  cartoonists being imprisoned under
these laws, however, we would surely have many other things to
worry about.
Meanwhile, the term ‘sedition’ continues to be used in senses
which the law does not support. An extreme, if  trivial, example
appears in Susan Mitchell’s January 2007 feature in the Australian: ‘I
hate the summer. For an Australian to make such a denouncement
borders on sedition.’58
It has also been suggested that sedition laws be used against the
sport psychologist who helped swimmer Ian Thorpe decide to
retire.59 Closer to having meaning for present purposes is the
declaration by comedian Charles Firth:
You see I support the sedition laws … In fact, I don’t think they go
far enough. I’ve come back to this country after living in New York,
and people are openly criticising the Government and that isn’t on.
In the US at least there’s an acknowledgement that you don’t really
push Bush. He’s the boss. But here, there’s no respect. Especially
for John Howard.60
Hence the ALRC’s careful explanation that the laws do not
prohibit criticism of  the government, or expression of  disrespect
for the Prime Minister, appears to have fallen on deaf  ears.
A related issue is the tendency of  commentators to report the
ALRC’s recommendations as extending to removal of  the sedition
laws, rather than simply of  the word ‘sedition’ itself.61 Even a pair of
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eminent academic lawyers appears to have implied—mistakenly—
that the removal of  the word would be a ‘substantial’ change.62
Others, while understanding that the ALRC’s recommendation was
merely about the word ‘sedition’, appear to have focused their
protests on the government’s refusal to remove the word, rather
than on the actual content of  the law.63 Moreover, the sedition laws
have been blamed for the ‘banning’ of  two pro-Jihad books that
were, in fact, refused classification under the Classification
(Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995.64
All of  this suggests that Australians have some way to go in
understanding the nature and effect of  these laws. We worry that a
community that is so fixated on a set of  laws that has little impact
on its civil liberties risks failing to pay attention to things that pose
a real threat. Therefore we can only endorse the ALRC’s
recommendation that:
Peak arts and media organisations should provide educational
programs and material to their members to promote a better
understanding of:
a. the scope of  federal, state and territory laws that
prohibit the urging of  political or inter-group force or
violence; and
b. any potential impact of  these laws on the activities of
their members.65
Conclusions
In this chapter we have argued that cartooning as it is presently
practised in Australian newspapers is very unlikely to fall foul of
defamation or sedition laws.
For defamation, it is very difficult to see how cartoons will be
mistaken as anything other than comment. Therefore they have a
ready defence under the law, unless they are very specifically
malicious. It is not clear that other satirical forms (prose, video,
photographs) would enjoy the same level of  protection, as they run
an intrinsically higher risk of  being interpreted literally as statements
of  fact rather than as comment.
For sedition, it would be an extremely unusual cartoon that urged
the violent overthrow of  the state, and it would even then be
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necessary to establish that, in the context of  the reception of
cartoons, the cartoon was interpreted as really meaning it. The
sedition laws have little probable impact on cartoonists. Again, we
cannot be as confident of  this for other satirists.
In spite of  all of  this, there remains the problem of  the ‘chilling
effect’, or self-censorship, beyond what is actually required out of
uncertainty as to the possible legal consequences of  speaking one’s
mind. This effect is a notoriously difficult thing to measure because
it is hard to determine what people might have said if  they had felt
safer from the law. An interesting future project would be to gather
stories from cartoonists of  when cartoons were pulled on ‘legal’
grounds, to assess whether these are realistic legal concerns, over-
cautiousness, or a disguise for other sensitivities such as the
commercial interests of  the publisher or perhaps good taste.
In the meantime, if  there has been a ‘chilling effect’ on the
exercise of  cartoonists’ free expression from a fear of  legal sanction,
we hope this chapter can ease their minds. As long as all participants
inform themselves accurately on the contours and operation of  the
laws of  defamation and sedition, those laws are very unlikely to be
constraints on the power of  cartoonists to shine brightly, even
during these dark times.
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